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THE INNOCENT SPOUSE RELIEF:
A RECONCILIATION OF CONFLICTING JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATIONS
by
DONALD C. HALEY*
INTRODUCTION
When a married couple elects to file ajoint federal income tax return, their combined
income is generally taxed at a rate which is lowerthan if each spouse had filed a separate
tax return.' A price for this advantage, however, is that the tax due on the aggregate
income is a joint and several liability.2 Accordingly, the entire tax liability (including
interest, penalties, and other amounts) may be assessed against either spouse? This can
lead to harsh consequences where, for example, one spouse omits reportable income or
claims false deductions and conceals these violations from the other spouse against
whom the resulting tax liability is assessed
In response to pleas for statutory relief from such an inequitable result, an "innocent
spouse" provision was added to the Internal Revenue Code in 1971. 5 As originally
enacted, these provisions were applicable only to omissions from gross income. In 1984,
amendments were enacted to include relief from understatements of tax liability result-
ing from disallowed deductions, credits, or basis in property which had no basis in fact
or law for inclusion in the joint return filed.6
This paper reviews the statutory requirements for obtaining the innocent spouse
relief, briefly identifies the degree of consensus among the courts in interpreting key
provisions of the statute, and then focuses on the major area of conflict in qualifying for
relief: the "lack of knowledge" requirement on the part of the alleged innocent spouse.
Particular attention is given to the rigid standard utilized by the Tax Court in its interpre-
tation of this critical requirement versus the broader, more flexible standard employed
by the U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. Finally, an analysis of
a workable reconciliation of these conflicting standards is set forth, together with some
expectations as to the future resolution by the courts.
J.D., C.P.A., Associate Professor of Accounting and Business Law, Cleveland State University.
I See I.R.C. § 1 (1988). see also Sonnenbom v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 373,380-81 (1971).
2 LR.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1988).
3 Id.
4 See, eg., Scudder v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 36 (1967).
5 Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L No. 91-679, §1, §4 Stat. 2063,2063 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 6013(e) (1988
& Supp. M 1992)).
6 Act of July 18,1984, Pub. L No. 98-369, § 424(a), 98 Stat. 801,801 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 6013(e) (1988
& Supp. MI 1992)).
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STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
INNOCENT SPOUSE RELIEF
While innocent spouse relief is available to a nonculpable spouse, I.R.C. § 6013(e)
contains specific requirements which must be met in order for such spouse to be relieved
of all or a portion of the joint liability. These requirements are:
(1) a joint return has been made under § 6013 for the taxable year,7
(2) on suchjoint return there is a substantial understatement oftax attrib-
utable to grossly erroneous items of one spouse,.
(3) the other spouse establishes that at the time of signing the return he
or she did not know, and had no reason to know, that there was such
substantial understatement,9 and
(4) taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it would be ineq-
uitable to hold the other spouse liable for the deficiency in tax for
such taxable year attributable to the substantial understatement. 10
Section 6013(e) then proceeds to define two key phrases used in requirement (2)
above. The first is "substantial understatement of tax"'" and the second is "grossly
erroneous items. 12
Generally, a "substantial understatement" is an understatement exceeding $500.1
If, however, the understatement is due to an unallowable deduction, credit, or basis (as
opposed to omissions from gross income), there is an added requirement. This require-
ment is that if the Adjusted Gross Income ("AGI") of the innocent spouse in the
"preadjustment year" is $20,000 or less, then the understatement must be greater than
10% of the AGI.14 If the AGI in the preadjustment year is more than $20,000, the
understatement must exceed 25% of his or her AGI in the preadjustment year before
relief can be obtained.15 The preadjustment year is the most recent taxable year of the
spouse ending before the date the tax deficiency notice is mailed.' 6
7 I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(A) (1988).
I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(B) (1988).
I.R.C. § 6013(e)(l)(C) (1988).
10 I.R.C. § 6013(e)(l)(D) (1988).
11 I.R.C. § 6013(e)(3) (Supp. I1 1992).
12 I.R.C. § 6013(e)(2) (1988).
13 I.R.C. § 6013(eX3) (Supp. 1 1992).
14 I.R.C. § 6013(e)(4)(A) (1988).
1" I.R.C. § 6013(eX4)(B) (1988).
16 I.R.C. § 6013(eX4)(C) (1988).
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"Grossly erroneous items" are those items which, with respect to the reportable
income of a spouse, are omitted from gross income.17 If, on the other hand, such items
were claims of deductions, credits, or basis by such spouse, they are "grossly erroneous
items" only to the extent there is no basis in fact or law for making such claims. 8
If the nonculpable spouse meets the burden ofestablishing that all of these statutory
requirements and definitions are met, then he or she is relieved of liability for tax
(including interest, penalties, and other amounts) for such taxable year.'9
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 6013(e):
AREAS OF GENERAL AGREEMENT
As previously indicated, failure to satisfy any one of the statutory requirements
disqualifies relief under § 6013(e), the "innocent spouse" provisions ° Accordingly, the
Internal Revenue Service and the courts meticulously scrutinize the facts in each case
to ensure strict statutory compliance before relief is granted. Although there continues
to be ongoing litigation as to the interpretation of each of the key provisions and defi-
nitions noted above, there has been a clear narrowing of differences between taxpayers,
the IRS and the courts in most areas, namely:
The Existence of a "Joint Return"
The key element in determining whether a joint return has been filed is the intent of
the two spouses.2' Although the signatures of each on the return isprimafacie evidence
of a joint return, evidence of a contrary intent is accepted by the courts.22 Hence, if one
spouse can show that his or her signature was forgedz  or was the result of duress,'
fraud, or misrepresentatione' by the other spouse, then there is no joint or several
liability of such spouse.27 On the other hand, courts will find that ajoint return has been
made where one spouse did not actually sign the return if it can be proved that it was his
or her intent that it be a joint return of the spouses.2
17 I.R.C. § 6013(e)(2)(A) (1988).
Is I.R.C. § 6013(eX2)(B) (1988).
19 I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1) (1988).
-' See I.R.C. § 6013(e) (1988 & Supp. InI 1992).
21 E.g., Federbush v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 1, 2 (2d Cir. 1963).
2 Federbush v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 740, 757 (1960), affd per curium, 325 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1963); Kann v.
Commissioner, 18 T.C. 1032,1045 (1952),aff'd,210 F.2d247,251 (3dCir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 967 (1954);
Howell v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 859, 866 (1948), aff'd per curiun, 175 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1949).
" E.g., Bauer v. Foley, 404 F.2d 1215, 1220 (2d Cir. 1968).
24 E.g., Hueisman v. Commissioner, 416 F.2d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1969).
"' See id.
2 E.g., Berenbeim v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.M. (P-H) 1991-272.
2 See, e.g., Cassity v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (P-H) 1987-181.
28 See, e.g., McRae v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (P-H) 1988-374.
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The Criteria For a "Substantial Understatement"
The specificity of § 6013(e)(3) and (4) greatly narrows the potential for disagree-
ment. Where disputes do reach the courts, they are resolved on the basis of the specific
facts of each case, most of which turn on accounting and/or mathematical determina-
tions of compliance with the statute.29
The Definition of "Grossly Erroneous Items"
As stated in § 6013(e)(2)(A), an omission from gross income in any amount is a
grossly erroneous item.' ° The relatively few disputes as to this definition involve inter-
pretations of whether the item omitted was properly includable in gross income. The
more frequent disputes in this area concern disallowed deductions, credits, or basis in an
amount for which there is no basis in fact or law.3 The courts have been consistent in
denying innocent spouse relief whenever the spouse fails to meet the burden of proving
that the disallowed item is utterly without factual or legal support.32 Accordingly, relief
has consistently been denied unless the claimed deduction, credit, or basis is determined
by the courts to be "fraudulent,"33 "frivolous,"'' "phony,"5 or "groundless." Hence, if
a court finds any support in law or fact, regardless of how unpersuasive, it will disallow
relief as not being a grossly erroneous item.37
The Meaning of "Inequitable To Hold The Other Spouse Liable"
This provision calls for a determination based on all the facts and circumstances of
each specific case.3s In assessing the equity of holding a spouse liable, the courts
generally consider factors such as (1) whether the spouse claiming relief significantly
benefited from the grossly erroneous item attributable to the culpable spouse;3 9 (2)
whether the spouse claiming relief has been deserted by, or divorced or separated from,
29 For this reason, there is a dearth of helpful cases involving definitional issues of whether an understatement exists.
See, e.g., id.
-' I.R.C. § 6013(e)(2)(A) (1988).31 I.R.C. §6013(eX2)(B) (1988).
3 See, e.g., Douglasv. Commissioner, 86T.C. 758(1986); Sivils v. Commissioner, 86T.C. 79(1986). SeealsoPurcell
v. Commissioner, 826 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 987 (1988).
11 E.g., Douglas, 86 T.C. at 762-63.
14 See id.
3s See Purcell, 826 F.2d at 475; Douglas, 86 T.C. at 762-63.
26 E.g., Sivils, 86 T.C. at 83.
3 E.g., Purcell 826 F.2d at 476; Douglas
, 
86 T.C. at 763; Sivils, 86 T.C. at 84-85.
31 See I.R.C. § 6013(3)(1)(D) (1988). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.6013-5(b) (1974).
19 See Estate of Krock v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 672. 677 (1989). See also S. REP. No. 91-1537, 91st Cong.. 2d
Sess. 3 (1970).
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the culpable spouse;0 (3) and the probable future hardships that would be faced by the
nonculpable spouse if he or she is not relieved from liability.41 Generally, the courts do
not decide this question unless and until all other requirements have been resolved in
favor of the innocent spouse, particularly the "knowledge of the understatement" re-
quirement which is next discussed in detail.
KNOWLEDGE OF THE UNDERSTATEMENT:
THE MOST LITIGATED AND CONTROVERSIAL REQUIREMENT
The most controversial of the requirements for innocent spouse relief is the question
of when should a spouse be denied relief for reason of knowing, or having reason to
know, that there was a substantial understatement of tax resulting from a grossly erro-
neous item attributable to the other spouse.
The courts are in general agreement that relief is denied where a reasonably prudent
person in possession of all the information actually or constructively known by the
nonculpable spouse would know or have reason to know, of the substantial understate-
ment of tax on the joint return.42 Likewise, there is general agreement as to the factors
to be considered in reaching this determination, which would include: (l)the innocent
spouse's level of education and business background,43 (2) his or her degree of involve-
ment in the business or transaction giving rise to the understatement,' (3) the existence
or nonexistence of lavish or unusual expenditures," (4) asudden and/ormarked increase
in the past standard of living of the family," (5) the degree ofjoint participation in family
financial matters, 7 and (6) the degree of evasiveness and deceitfulness of the culpable
spouse."*
Where the courts sharply disagree, however, is in defining the standards to be
utilized in evaluating these factors. In general, the Tax Court has adopted a more
stringent standard in its "lack of knowledge" decisions,49 whereas the U.S. Courts of
40 See Tress. Reg. §1.6013-5(b) (1974). See also Flynn v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 355,367 (1989).
4' See Sanders v. Commissioner, 509 F.2d 162, 166-67 (5th Cir. 1975).
42 Stevens v. Commissioner, 872 F.2d 1499, 1505 (1lth Cir. 1989); Sanders v. States, 509 F.2d 162, 167 (5th Cir.
1975).
43 E.g., Mysse v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 680,689-92 (1972).
See id.
4 Eg., Sanders, 509 F.2d at 167.
See, eg., i.d
47 See, eg., id.
" See, e.g., id. "The Courts, particularly the Tax Court, have utilized all or most of the factors in construing the "lack
of knowledge" requirement from the initial enactment of Code Sec. 101 3(e), finding both for and against the granting
ofinnocent spouse relief." See, e.g., Mysse, 57 T.C. at 689-92; McCoy v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 732,733,735 (1972).
" See Bokum v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 126 (1990); aff'd, 992 F.2d 1132 (11th Cir. 1993); Sonnenbom v. Commis-
sioner, 57 T.C. 373 (1971).
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Appeal for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have rejected the use of a rigid standard and
extend theirinquiry to a consideration of the facts and circumstances impacting the level
of constructive knowledge of the understatement to which the nonculpable spouse will
be held.' The specific factor at the center of this controversy is the consequence of the
nonculpable spouse having actual knowledge of the transaction or events causing the
understatement, without having actual knowledge of the resulting understatement itself.
These conflicting views are described and evaluated separately.
THE TAX COURT STANDARD:
AUTOMATIC DENIAL OF RELIEF IF THERE IS ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE
TRANSACTION CAUSING THE UNDERSTATEMENT
From its first decisions involving newly-enacted § 6013(e), the IRS and the Tax
Court have employed an exacting standard in determining whether a spouse knew, or
had reason to know, of the understatement of tax. This took the form of a rigorous
application of the factors discussed above in determining what he or she had reason to
know about the circumstances resulting in the understatement. This view is clearly
illustrated in Sonnenbrom v. Commissioner, a case decided in the same year (1971) that
the innocent spouse provisions were enacted. In this case, the Tax Court was clear in
stating its perspective that an innocent spouse must fully comply with "the carefully
detailed conditions set forth in Section 6013(e)." 1 Thereafter, the Tax Court has con-
sistently employed a rigid objective standard of what it considers aprudent person would
have reason to know about the understatement rather than considering what the spouse
had reason to know based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 2
The "knowledge of the understatement" cases in which the Tax Court is in clear
conflict with the Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal are those in which the
nonculpable spouse has actual knowledge of the transaction underlying the claim of a
grossly erroneous deduction, creditor basis but alleges lack of knowledge of the result-
ing understatement of tax. The Tax Court takes the position that such knowledge of the
transaction, standing alone, precludes allowance of innocent spouse relief.53 It reaf-
firmed the use of this rigid standard in its 1990 decision of Bokum v. Commissioner.'
The facts in Bokum are highly instructive as to the standard used by the Tax Court.
Margaret Bokum filed a joint return with her husband, Richard, for 1977.5 Previously,
in 1971, Richard formed a Subchapter S corporation which purchased a large ranch for
' See Erdahl v. Commissioner, 930 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1991); Guth v. Commissioner, 897 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1990);
Price v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1989).
SI Sonnenborn, 57 T.C. at 380-81.
Seeid.at381-82.
See id. at 382.
Bokum v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 126 (1990). afftd, 992 F.2d 1132 (11th Cir. 1993).
I5 d. at 131.
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the purpose of conducting a cattle and ranch business.56 In 1977, the corporation sold
a substantial portion of the ranch and made a distribution of this sale and other amounts
to Richard, the sole stockholder.517 The reporting of this transaction was challenged by
the Internal Revenue Service and the parties stipulated to a substantial deficiency on the
joint 1977 return which resulted primarily from the erroneous reduction of reportable
dividend income by the amount of Richard's basis in the corporate stock.58 Margaret
claimed innocent spouse relief under § 6013(e).59 After finding that the requirements of
§ 6013(e)(2)(B) were met (namely, that the error in basis resulted from a "grossly
erroneous item"), the Tax Court then denied relief on the basis that Margaret had reason
to know of the understatement of tax because she knew of the underlying transaction
which was the sale of the ranch.60 Despite the fact that she had a limited educational and
business background, had never worked outside the home, did not participate in corpo-
rate or Richard's business affairs, was not involved in the preparation of the return, and
the reporting of the transaction was admittedly complex, the Tax Court nevertheless
concluded that because Margaret knew of the transaction that gave rise to the substantial
understatement she was disqualified, under § 6013(e)(1)(C), from innocent spouse
status.61 As discussed below, although the decision was supported by an 11 to 5 majority
vote, the court was sharply divided as to the appropriate standard to be used in resolving
the "knowledge of the understatement" issue.62
THE COURTS OF APPEAL FOR THE EIGHTH, NINTH AND ELEVENTH CIRCUITS: A
MORE COMPREHESIVE "KNOWLEDGE OF THE UNDERSTATEMENT" STANDARD
FOR DEDUCTION, CREDIT AND BASIS CONTROVERSIES
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Several months prior to the Tax Court's decision inBokum, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's decision in Price v. Commissioner.63 In this
s1 Id. at 129.
57 Id. at 127.
I at 132-34.
Id .at 128, 135-37.
Id. at 139-40. According to the majority opinion:
We have found that Mragaret knew of the sale of the range. Petitioner's erroneous claim of
basis sterns from a misapprehension of the tax consequences and not the facts of the sale. Accord-
ingly, if the relevant underlying transaction is that sale, then Margaret knew of the circumstances
that gave rise to the substantial understatement and thus is disqualified from the innocent spouse
status under... [LR.C. §1 6013(e)(I)(c).
Id. at 146.
1 Id. at 148-49.
a Id.
' Price v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1989). This decision was decided on October 18, 1989, just five
months prior to Bolwm.
1993]
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case, Patricia Price knew that her husband, Charles, had taken a large deduction on their
jointly filed return which was related to a gold mining venture in which she knew he had
invested." Patricia had limited involvement in the couple's financial affairs, had no
involvement in the mining investment, there were no lavish expenditure during this
period of time, and she was deceived by her husband when she questioned him about the
reporting of the transaction." Evidence admitted during the trial established that Patricia
signed the return only after receiving assurance of its correctness and that it had been
prepared by a certified public accountant." Although the Tax Court found that Patricia
did not know of the incorrectness of the deduction, it denied her innocent spouse relief
by holding that her knowledge of the underlying transaction disqualified her from inno-
cent spouse status since it put her on notice of the resulting understatement.67
In a methodical approach to construing § 6013(e)(1)(C) (i.e., whether Patricia knew
or had reason to know of the understatement), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals first
found that, based on the record, Patricia had met her burden of showing lack of actual
knowledge of the understatement." It next turned to the question of whether she had
reason to know of the understatement at the time of signing the return.69 Applying the
factors discussed above (level of education, involvement in the family's business and
financial affairs, presence or absence of lavish expenditures or changes in lifestyles, the
evasiveness and deceitfulness of the culpable spouse and her efforts to ascertain the
correctness of the reporting of the transaction), the court found that"a reasonably prudent
person in Patricia's position at the time she signed the return could not be expected to
know that the return contained a substantial understatement.'"
The court distinguished cases involving omissions from income from those cases
involving grossly enoneous deductions, credits, or basis (frequently referred to merely
as "deduction cases"). 71 It basically agreed with the Tax Court that in omission cases a
knowledge of the underlying transaction does put the spouse on notice that an understate-
ment results when it is left off the retum.7 However, it rejected the use of this standard
in deduction cases, in part because it would for the most part wipe out innocent spouse
protection in those cases."3 The Court emphasized that knowledge of the underlying
transaction in deduction cases is a significant factor to be considered in determining
" Id. at 960-61.
l1 Id. at 961,965.
" Id. at 961.
17Id. at 965.
I8 d.
Id. at 965-66.
"o Id. at 965.
71 Id. at 963-64.
7 Id.
SId. at 963 n. 9.
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whether the innocent spouse had such full knowledge of the transaction as to be put on
notice of the resulting understatement. 4 In essence, the Court found that such knowl-
edge of the underlying transaction imposed a duty of further inquiry on the innocent
spouse to determine if the deduction is valid, but that, standing alone, such knowledge
does not preclude relief.75 It then noted that if this "duty to inquire" standard was not
utilized, Patricia's only remaining defense would then be ignorance of the law, which is
unacceptable in attempting to show lack of reason to know of the understatement. 6 As
a final consideration, the Court then found that it would be inequitable not to grant
Patricia relief in view of the facts of the case, a conclusion the Tax Court also indicated
it would have reached if it had ruled favorably on all the otherrequirements of § 6013(e).'
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
Earlier in 1989, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Stevens v. Commis-
sioner upheld the Tax Court in its denial of innocent spouse relief by concluding that the
petitioner, Madeline Stevens, failed to prove that she had no reason to know of the
substantial understatements of tax liability.8 In 1974, Madeline's husband, Robert,
formed a securities firm in which he was sole shareholder, president, and treasurer. 9
Madeline served as corporate secretary and her duties included record-keeping related
to the sale of tax shelters, preparing reports to be sent to the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and typing business correspondence.' Syndicators frequently discussed
the pros and cons of tax shelters in her presence. 81 Following audits of the Stevens' joint
tax return for 1976 through 1979, the Internal Revenue Service issued a notice of sub-
stantial tax deficiencies for those years due to the disallowance of deductions claimed
for tax shelter losses and the disallowance of related loss canyforwards.8 After stipu-
lationsby the parties, the only remaining issue at trial was whetherMadeline was entitled
to relief from the joint tax liability as an "innocent spouse. 813
The two issues raised on appeals were (1) whether the Tax Court failed as a matter
of law to apply the correct legal standard in evaluating the knowledge element of §
6013(e)(1)(C), and (2) whether the Tax Court erred in concluding that Madeline failed
74 Id. at 964-65.
7- Id. at 965-66.
7 Id. at 964.
ld. at 966.
S tevens v. Commissioner, 871 F.2d 1499,1506-08 (1 lth Cir. 1989). This decision is particularly significant since
the Botwn decision is on appeal to this Court.
7 Id. at 1500-01.
I d. at 1501.
LI Id.
I ld. at 1502.
83 Id.
1993]
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to satisfy these elements necessary for relief even if the correct standard had been
applied." The Court of Appeals first found that the Tax Court utilized the correct
standard in inquiring whether Madeline, in signing the returns, knew or had reason to
know that the returns contained unallowable deductions." Because the Tax Court in its
decision did not discuss whetherMadeline had actual knowledge of the understatements,
the appeals court limited its inquiry to whether she had reason to know of them." Citing
Sanders v. United States, 7 the Court held that a spouse has "reason to know" if a
reasonably prudent taxpayerunder the circumstances of the spouse at the time of signing
the return could be expected to know that the tax liability stated was erroneous or that
further investigation was warranted." The Court found that further investigation by
Madeline was warranted, based upon her level of education (two years of college),
involvement in the business, knowledge of the investment resulting in the erroneous
deductions, lavish expenditures made on her behalf, and Robert's admitted evasiveness
to her questioning of the returns. 89 Noting that Madeline confessed that she ultimately
"blindly" signed the returns, the Court found that she failed to meet her duty of further
inquiry as to the accuracy of the return and therefore failed to prove she did not have
reason to know of the substantial understatements of tax.9°
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
Subsequent to Bokwn, Price and the Stevens decisions, the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reversed the Tax Court in its 1991 decision inErdahl v. Commissioner.91
In this case, Bruce Erdahl invested in a limited partnership organized to acquire a luxury
condominium complex.92 The funds used for this investment were borrowed from the
pension fund of a professional corporation he established for his medical practice.93 His
wife, Gwen, was aware of this loan since she was a trustee of the pension plan and her
signature was required for a plan amendment required to make the loan.94 On their 1982
joint return, the taxpayers claimed a significant loss from the partnership which was
subsequently disallowed by the Internal Revenue Service after the Erdahls were di-
vorced.95 The taxpayers conceded the resulting tax deficiency and additions to tax, but
Mrs. Erdahl petitioned the Tax Court for relief from liability under the innocent spouse
u Id. at 1503.
I d. at 1504-05.
1 Id. at 1505.
'7 Sanders v. United States, 509 F.2d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1975).
" Stevens, 871 F.2d at 1505.
0 Id. at1506-07.
90 Id.
91 Erdahl v. Commissioner, 930 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1991).
92 Id. at587.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 588.
95 Id.
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provision of § 6013(e).96 After stipulations by the parties, the only remaining issues were
whether she knew or had reason to know of the understatement at that time she signed
the return and whether it would be inequitable to hold her liable for the tax deficiency.Y
The Tax Court decided that Mrs. Erdahl was not entitled to innocent spouse relief
because she knew or had reason to know of the underlying circumstances which gave
rise to the disallowed loss, thereby not reaching the issue of whether it would be ineq-
uitable to hold her liable for the deficiency.91 The Eighth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's
decision, expressly agreeing with the Ninth Circuit's conclusion in Price that mere
knowledge of the transaction which underlies the erroneous deduction, without more,
does not preclude relief.99 This Court adopted the same basic standard as that utilized
by the Ninth Circuit in Price and Guth and asks whether a reasonably prudent taxpayer
under the circumstances of the spouse at the time of signing the return could be expected
to know that the tax liability stated was erroneous or that further investigation was
warranted. °° It also expressly agreed with the Ninth Circuit that although mere knowl-
edge of the underlying transaction that produced omitted income is sufficient to deny
innocent spouse relief, application of this test to deduction cases would for the most part
wipe out innocent spouse protection. 10' Accordingly, the Court concluded its decision
with the finding that the Tax Court had imposed a far more stringent standard on Mrs.
Erdahl than required by § 6013(e)(1)(C) because it failed to consider the totality of the
circumstances relative to her at the time she signed the return0 2
IDENTIFICATION AND RECONCILIATION OF
APPARENT JUDICIAL CONFLICTS
As discussed above, although there is continuing litigation overthe right to innocent
spouse relief under § 6013(e) in different factual situations, there has been a significant
narrowing of disagreements among the courts as to the standards, or factors, tobeutilized
in reaching their decisions. Thus, there is a continuing development of consensus as to
standards to be used in determining the existence of a "joint return," the criteria for a
"substantial understatement of tax," the definition of "grossly erroneous items" in both
omissions of income and deductions cases, and the criteria for "inequitability" in
denying relief.
The major area of continuing controversy and conflict among the courts is that
relating to § 6013(e)(1)(C), the requirement that the claimant for relief meet the burden
% Id.
97 Id.
" Id. at 590.
9 Id. at 590-91.
10 Id. (quoting Stevens v. United States, 872 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th Cir. 1989)).
101 Id. at 589 (citing Price v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 959,963 (9th Cir. 1989).
102 Id. at 591.
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ofproofthat in signing the joint returnhe orshe did not know, and had no reason to know,
that there was a substantial understatement in such return. With respect to substantial
understatements resulting from omissions of income, there is little difference among the
courts as to the standard to be used: actual knowledge of the underlying transaction, per
se, is generally accepted as actual or constructive knowledge of the resulting understatement.
The sharp conflict in interpretation of the "lack of knowledge" provision applies to
those cases involving substantial understatements resulting from inclusion in the return
of grossly erroneous items of deductions, credits, or basis. The Tax Court continues to
follow the philosophy it first enunciated in Sonnenborn v. Commissioner,'03 a case it
decided in 1971 - the same year § 6013(e) was enacted. This perspective is that the
benefits of filing a joint return are available in exchange for the burdens of joint and
several liability of the spouses for the resulting tax due on the joint return. In its 1990
decision in Bokum, the Tax Court continued to cite its Sonnenborn philosophy of strict
compliance with the "carefully detailed conditions set forth in Section 6013(e)."' ° The
significance of this is that the Tax Court has refused to change its standard for resolving
controversies over the issue of whether a spouse knew or had reason to know of the
understatement solely from knowledge of the underlying transactions both in omission
from income cases and in deduction cases, despite the Ninth Circuit having previously
rejected the use of this standard in deduction cases in its detailed 1989 opinion in Price
followed by a similar conclusion in its decision in Guth v. Commissioner. 101 Inits lengthy
Bokum opinion the Tax Court expressly rejected the Ninth Circuit's broader standard of
recognizing "knowledge of the underlying transaction" as significant, but not control-
ling, in cases involving substantial understatements resulting from the disallowance of
grossly erroneous items of deductions, credits, or basis.101 Accordingly, the Tax Court
states its refusal to follow the opinion in Price except in those instances where appeal
lies to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 17
In deciding the 1991 case of Erdahl v. Commissioner, the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's denial of relief and solidly adopted the Ninth
Circuit's standard. The Eighth Circuit outright rejected the standard used by the Tax
Im Sonnenbom v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 373 (1971).
10' Bokumv. Commissioner, 94T.C. 126,151-52 (1990),aff'd, 992 F.2d 1132 (1 lthCir. 1993) (quoting Sonnenborn,
57 T.C. at 381).
101 Guth v. Commissioner, 897 F2d 441 (9th Cir. 1990).
11 Bokun, 94 T.C. at 152-56.
107 Id. at 151. This applies to taxpayers who reside, at the time they file their Tax Court petitions, in Arkansas, Iowa,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, or South Dakota.
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Court in Bokwn in "knowledge of the transaction" cases involving substantial under-
statements attributable to grossly erroneous items of deductions, credits, or basis."
Although the Tax Court inBokwn did aggressively defend its exacting standard that
a spouse is held to actual or constructive knowledge of a resulting understatement
whenever he or she has knowledge of the underlying transaction in both omission and
deduction cases, itused a standard inStevens that was identical to that used by the Eighth,
Ninth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal as discussed above.' 9 Additionally, its
more recent applications of this standard to its decisions are increasingly reconcilable
with the criteria utilized by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. For example, careful analyses
of the Bokum decision discloses that despite its stated refusal to follow Price, the Tax
Court set forth evidence supporting that "a reasonable person with Margaret's back-
ground" would have noticed the erroneous subtraction of Richard's basis from the
sizable reportable divided, and she should have noticed that the tax preparer's block had
not been filled in.°10 The Tax Court then concluded that Margaret either knew or had
mason to know of the circumstances that gave rise to the substantial understatement and
thus was disqualified from relief under § 6013(e)(1)(C)."' This is an apparent attempt
to establish that since she failed to make further inquiry as to the corrections of the return
under these circumstances, Margaret was disqualified from innocent spouse status even
if this broader standard embraced by the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of
Appeal had been used. Additionally, the Tax Court was sharply divided in its opinion,
with ten judges formally agreeing with the decision, one judge concurring with the
majority in result only while expressing concern over "unnecessarily creating a deci-
sional conflict with the Ninth Circuit,""2 and five judges dissenting. Further, three
judges formally a part of the majority wrote a concurring opinion expressing their belief
that Circuit's analysis in Price was consistent with their belief that in deduction, credit
IU Erdal v. Commissioner, 930 E2d 585,586-87,589,589 rL 5 (8th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, the Tax Court now
must extend the application of the Price and Erdahl standards to those taxpayers who reside, at the time they file their
petitions, in Arizona. California, Idaho, Montana, Nevade, Oregon, and Washington.
"v See Bokwn, 94T.C. at 151-57. See also rdahl, 930 E2d at 589-90; Guth v. Commissioner, 897 F.2d 441,443-
44 (9th Cir. 1990); Price v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 959,964-65 (9th Cir. 1989); Stevens v. Commissioner, 872 F.2d
1499, 1504-05, 1505 n. 8 (11th Cir. 1989).
115 Bown, 94 T.C. at 147-48.
"' Id. at 148-50. The Tax Court stated:
The standard to be applied in determining whether a putative innocent spouse has "reason to
know," under [I.R.C. §] 6013(e)(1)(C) is whether "a reasonably prudent taxpayer under the circnm-
stances of the spouse at the time of signing the retum could be expected to know that the tax liability
stated was erroneous or that further investigation was warranted."
Id. at 148 (quoting Stevens, 872 E2d at 1505). This is an apparent attempt to establish that Margaret was disqualified
from relief even if this broader standard embraced by the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal were
used.
nt Id. at 159-60 (Parr, J., concurring).
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and basis disallowance cases the Court's inquiry of the "reason to know" of the under-
statement should go beyond the mere knowledge of the underlying transactions and
include other circumstances indicating alackorpresenceofareasontoknow."3 Ineffect,
then only seven of the judges voting in Bokwn were left fully endorsing the view that the
restrictive "knowledge ofthe transaction" rule, standing alone, equates to knowledge of
the understatement. The remaining nine judges either fully or substantially agreed with
the Eighth and Ninth Circuits' standard.
A further indication of movement toward reconciliation of this conflict is that the
citations in Bokum of prior Circuit Courts' opinions as support for the Tax Court's
standard are less than fully convincing upon careful analysis.1 4 Finally, while several
Tax Court decisions in addition to Bokum are now on appeal to various Circuit Courts
of Appeal, all are omission of income cases rather than disputes involving erroneous
deduction items.
CONCLUSION
This author believes that the broader standard used by the Eighth Circuit in Erdahl,
the Ninth Circuit in Price and Guth and the Eleventh Circuit in Stevens will be supported
by other Circuits when "knowledge of the understatement" cases involving erroneous
deduction items are decided by them. Further, as noted above, a probable majority of
the Tax Court has philosophically already adopted this broader standard and can be
expected to soon broaden the narrow standard enunciated in the majority opinion in
Bokum, particularly if the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals utilizes it in deciding the
appeal of this case. Until this de facto reconciliation becomes a formality, counsel to
taxpayers seeking innocent spouse relief in grossly erroneous deduction, credit, and
basis disallowance cases should utilize the above-discussed Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits' standard in gathering evidence to support the position of their clients.
'"3 Id. at 158-59 (Swift, J., concurring).
. For example, the majority opinion cites as support Purcell v. Commissioner, 826 F.2d 470,474 (6th Cir. 1987).
Bokwm, 94 T.C. at 146 However, the "knowledge of the transaction" issue in Purcell involved an ommission from
income and not an eroneous deduction. See Purcell, 826 F.2d at 471-72. It also cites Stevens v. Commissioner, 872
F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th Cir. 1989) and Shea v. Commissioner, 780 F.2d 561,566 (6th Cir. 1986). Bokwn, 94 T.C. at
148. In citing Stevens and Shea the Tax Court endorses the standard to be applied as "whether a reasonably prudent
taxpayer under the circumstances of the spouse at the time of signing the return could be expected to know that the
tax liability stated was erroneous or that further investigation was warranted." Id. at 148 (quoting Stevens, 872 F.2d
at 1505). This is the same standard which was utilized by the Eighth Circuit in Erdahi and the Ninth Circuit in Price
and Guth. See Erdahlv. Commissioner, 930 E2d 585,589-90; Guth v. Commissioner, 897 F.2d 441,443-44 (9th Cir.
1990); Price v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 959,964-65 (9th Cir. 1989).
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